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Abstrac#- This paper presents an e-transactions protacol 
using mobile agents. However, when mobile agents travel to a 
number of servers for searching optimal purchase for the 
underlying customer, the mobile codes should be protected. 
We integrate a secure signature algorithm with the e- 
transaction algorithm to maintain the security. In addition, an 
agent broker is involved in the algorithm, that will help to 
reduce the communications among the mobile agents, the 
customer, and the servers. We have presented security and 
privacy analysis for the proposed protocol. 
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1, Introduction 
There are increasing number of applications that seek to use 
mobile agents in e-commerce and virtual communities. 
Security and privacy are major issues for such environments. 
Various solutions have been proposed for this issue, for 
example, encryption techniques, digital signature techniques 
(including general signature scheme, blind signature scheme, 
undeniable signature scheme, group signature scheme, and 
other cryptographic techniques [2 ] ,  as well as steganography 
techniques. 
Mobile agents are autonomous software entities [ 1 1  that can 
migrate autonomously from one networked computer to 
another. Therefore, mobile agents can help to fulfill e- 
transactions initiated by a client in electronic commerce. 
However, the mobile agent could encounter a hostile 
environment. For example, a server may compromise the 
mobile agent and try to obtain private information from the 
client. A solution to tackle this issue has been proposed. The 
existing solution is implemented using RSA signatures that 
result in long signatures and heavy workloads for the mobile 
agent. Mobile agents will migrate from the client to a server 
and from one server to another in order to accomplish the 
client’s transaction plan. Therefore, it will be interesting to re- 
approach this issue. In this paper, we will utilize the short 
signatures to construct the mobile agents. That will increase 
the efficiency and reduce the mobile communication workload 
for the mobile agents. 
Another issue is the mobile agent will make electronic 
transactions interaction with more than one server (electronic 
shop) in order to. find an optimal purchase for its owner (a 
client or a customer). In this situation, the mobile agent should 
need to come back to its owner (the customer), since the owner 
will check whether the purchase is ‘the best one’ or ‘not good’. 
However, that will increase the communication workload for 
the mobile agents, as well as for the customer. Therefore, it 
will be much more interesting if we can provide an agent 
broker, who will help the customer to make decision during 
the course of the whole purchase plan, since the agent broker 
will compare among the different electronic transactions made 
by the mobile agent and then select the best one. 
In addition, it is known that the development of the 
electronic commerce is influencing and also has already 
influenced the financial areas in our society. The central point 
is that the electronic commerce is highly linked to the privacy 
[XI of the underlying participants in the electronic commerce, 
for example, the bank account, the credit card, the personal 
address, etc. Therefore, the privacy is highly related to the 
financial issues in the electronic commerce. Hence, it is 
necessary to provide the privacy protection mechanism for the 
customers in the electronic transactions in our new paper. We 
utilize some public key techniques to realize this point. 
In brief, ‘the characteristics of our new scheme for secure 
electronic transactions with mobile agents include: We 
construct the mobile agents using short signatures; we provide 
an agent broker for the underlying customer and the mobile 
agents; we provide privacy protection mechanism for the 
underlying customer and the servers (electronic shops). 
The new design in our paper will provide an optimal 
choice for the current eIectronic commerce with mobile agents. 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In 
section 2, we first provide the model of electronic transactions 
using mobile agents with an agent broker. A new transaction 
protocol using mobile agents with an agent broker is proposed 
in section 3. The analysis and proofs are provided, mainly 
including security analysis and privacy analysis in section 4. 
The performance analysis is discussed in section 5. In section 
6,  we present the conclusions for the paper. 
11. Model of e-Transactions using MAS with AB 
In this section, we will propose a new model for electronic 
transactions (e-transactions) protocol using mobile agents with 
an agent broker. This model outlines an overview of the 
procedures of the e-transactions protocol. In this model, there 
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are at least four participants involving in the whole process of 
the purchase initiated by a customer. 
Model (Model of e-Transactions Using MAS with AB) 
There are at least four participants involving in the model. The 
participants are: a customer C (which plays the role of the 
identifier of the customer), a number of servers (i.e. electronic 
shops) s, , s,, . . . , s,, (which play the roles of all the servers, 
respectively), an agent broker AB (which plays the role of the 
identifier of the agent broker) and a number of mobile agents 
MA,, MA,,  . . .,MA,, (which play the roles of these mobile 
agents, respectively) . Besides these participants, there are six 
procedures for the proposed model. These procedures deliver 
the specifications for the electronic transactions protocol using 
mobile agents (MAS) with an agent broker (AB). The details of 
this model are as follows: 
(1) Setup Algorithm: This procedure is a probabilistic 
polynomial time algorithm. It generates public key and private 
key for the customer,. and also some public parameters for the 
corresponding servers. I n .  this algorithm, the customer will 
construct her purchase requirements Req, according to her 
purchase plan. 
(2) Key Algorithm: This procedure i s  a deterministic 
polynomial time algorithm. In this algorithm, the customer 
and these servers will choose a suitable public key encryption 
algorithm EpahBpn,.  By a self-certificate technique [2], the 
customer and the servers choose their own private keys and 
public keys, respectively. If the bid of one of the servers 
S1,SZ,.,.,Sn is decided as an optimal one, the underlying 
server will communicate with the customer through the public 
key encryption algorithm (if needed), 
(3) Preparing Mobile Agents: This procedure is a 
polynomial time algorithm. It involves the interactions 
between the customer and its mobile agents. The customer 
will construct some mobile codes for each mobile agent 
MA, (1 I j 5 n) . These mobile codes include:. C, Re qc , 
and a pair of undetachable signature functions. The 
undetachable signature function pair are used to generate the 
bids on the purchase requirement. Therefore, these mobile 
agents will travel with the mobile codes to these servers. 
A. Serup Algorithm 
(4) Bids Generation: This procedure is a deterministic 
polynomial time algorithm. In this procedure, the servers 
s, , s, , . . . , s,, will generate the corresponding bid according 
to the purchase requirement, respectively. And each server 
equips the underlying mobile agent with their own bid, 
The details of the notations used in this paper are as follows: 
I .  GI and G, are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime 
order p ;  
2. g, is a generator of GI and g ,  is a generator of G, ; 
3. y/ is an isomorphism from G, to G, , with v(g,) = g ,  ; 
and 
(5) Agent Broker Making Decisions: This is a probabilistic 
polynomial time algorithm. Each mobile agent will send the 
new version of mobile codes to the agent broker. The agent 
broker will record and compare these mobile cades (de facto 
the bids), and provide the customer with the purchase 
recommendations RI R, ,  . . . , R,  with an optimal e-transaction 
(i.e. the optimal bid). 
(6) Accepting Transactions: This procedure is a 
deterministic polynomial time algorithm. The customer firs1 
checks whether the time-stamp is still valid. If it is valid, the 
customer will verify the signature on the bid. If it is legal, and 
also the bid is an optimal one, the customer will accept this 
bid. In the end, the customer will arrange to transfer some 
money into the bank account of the corresponding server. 
111. New Protocol for Secure e-Transactions 
. using Mobile Agents with Agent Broker 
In this section, a new protocol for secure e-transactions is 
proposed. This protocol is implemented using a new 
undetachable signature scheme. This new undetachable 
scheme belongs to the domain of short signatures [6,7]. Shofl 
signatures have the characteristics of shorter bit-length of 
signatures, fast signature generation, as well as fast signature 
verification [4]. These characteristics are imperative for 
mobile agents, which take part in the secure transactions 
between a customer and any server. 
Previous constructions of udetachable signatures essentially 
utilize two methods: One method is based on birational 
functions as introduced by Sharmir. This kind of construction 
has been proven to be not secure [4], since it is vulnerable 
against the attacks proposed by Coppersmith et al [SI. The 
other method is based on RSA signatures. It is known that the 
signature length will be at least 1024bit in order to maintain 
the security of the RSA cryptosystem included. That will 
increase the workload of the mobile agents involved. 
Therefore, it i s  still an open problem to construct an optimized 
undetachable signature scheme for mobile agents. In the 
following, we will present a new construction for secure 
transactions with mobile agents. This construction is based on 
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [2, IO]. Generally speaking, 
signatures based on ECC by themselves do not mean they are 
short signatures. However, the proposed signatures in our 
paper are short signatures. The details are as follows: 
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4. e is a biIinear map e : G, X G, -+ GT 
For simplicity one can set G1 = G2. However, as in [2], 
we allow for the more genera1 case where GI # G, so that we 
can take advantage of certain fandies of elliptic curves to 
obtain short signatures. Specifically, elements of G1 have a 
short representation whereas elements of G, may not. The 
proofs of security require an efficiently computable 
isomorphism v :  G, + GI.  
When G, = G, and g l  = 82 one could take y to be the 
identity map. On elliptic curves we can use the trace map as y. 
Let GI and G, be two groups as above, with an additional 
group G, such that 
l~ll=lG2l=(G7.l. 
A bilinear map is a map e : G, X G, + G, with the 
following properties: 
1. Bilinear: for all U E G,, ut? G, and U,  b E Z, 
e(.., v 6 )  = e(u, vlab . 
2 .  Non-degenerate: &,, g 2 )  = 1 . 
We say that ( G I ,  G,) are bilinear groups if there exists a 
group G, , an isomorphism 
y : G ,  +GI, 
and a bilinear map 
e : GI x G, + G, as above, 
and e, ry, and the group action in G, , G,, and G, can be 
computed efficiently. 
Each customer selects two generators g ,  E G, , g, E G ,  , 
and e(. , .) as above. He will choose X f  2; and computes 
v = gi E G,. H ,  and H ,  are two secure cryptographic 
hash functions, such as SHA-1 [2]. That is: 
( I )  Customer selects g,  E G, , g, E G, two generators. 
(2) Customer Selects bilinear mapping e(., .) as above. 
(3) Customer randomly selects x E zi  and computes 
L 
V = g ; E G , .  
(4) Customer selects two securely cryptographic hash 
functions HI and H , :  
keyis g , ,  g,, e ( . , . ) ,  v , H , , a n d  H , .  
Therefore, the private key of the customer is x; the public 
Since we are constructing a transactions protocol, we 
should specify some corresponding information about the 
customer and the server, For example, who is the buyer? And 
who is the bidder (de facto seller). That is, what is the 
corresponding information of the customer and the servers. 
Here, the servers represent the host computers (electronic 
shops) the mobile agents will visit in the transactions. 
Therefore, we let C be an identifier for the customer, and 
SI,  s,, , , . , s,, be the corresponding identifier of these 
servers, respectively. 
We denote the constraints of the customer by Req,. 
This item is defined as follows: 
Reg, defines the requirements of the customer for a 
specific purchase. It includes: ( I )  the description of a desired 
product; (2) an expiration date and time stamp; (3) the 
maximum price that is acceptable to the customer; (4) a 
deadline for the delivery of the product. 
In addition, the agent broker holds the public 
parameters: g,, g , ,  e( - ,  *), V ,  U ,  and H , ,  where 
U = g; E GI. The agent broker will utilize these public 
parameters to help the customer make decisions and choose an 
optimal e-transactions for the purchase requirement. 
B. Key Algorithm 
The Key algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm, whch is executed by the customer and all the 
servers, as well as the agent broker. 
(1) A practical public key encryption algorithm EpubBprv, 
will be used by the customer and the servers, as well as the 
agent broker, respectively. Here, pub and prv are the 
public key and the private key respectively. They may coexist 
or only one of them exists in the public key algorithm, since it 
is decided according to different encryption algorithm. 
and 
private key p w C .  Both of them are self-certified by the 
(3) Each server sj(l 5 j 5 n )  gets a pair of public key 
pub,, and private key p r ~  Both of them are self- 
certified by these servers, respectively. 
(4) The agent broker gets a pair of public key pub, and 
private key pw, . Both of them are self-certified by these 
servers, respectively. 
(2) The customer gets a pair of public key pubc 
customer. 
5, ' 
All these public keys and private keys will be involved 
when the customer initiates the e-Transaction with all the 
servers SI ,  s2 ,. . . , s, , as well as the agent broker. The public 
key encryption algorithm can maintain the private 
communications between the customer and the servers, as well 
as the agent broker. 
C .  Preparing the Agmts 
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The customer equips the Mobile Agents 
with executable codes. The executable 
undetachable signature function pair: 
and 
M A , ,  MA,, . . . , MAn 
codes are in fact an 
a 
~ 
where U = H ,  (e, Req, )  is bounded by p; b = g; E GI, 
where the exponentiation is computed modular p. This b is in 
fact a variant version of the short signature in the following: 
- a  - 
b = g; E G, 
We look on C as a message, Reg, as a random element. 
Then, the above a and b could be treated as the signature 
I 
0 = h(m, r);  
on the message m; where h(m, r ) =  gp. This signature 
scheme's security is based on an assumption of q-SDH [3]. 
Equipped with the executable codes, the mobile agents 
will migrate from the customer to the servers. These mobile 
agents will carry C and Re qc as part of their data, and f ( 1 
and ysiRned ( ) as mobile codes, respectively. 
C. Bids Generation 
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the j-th 
mobile agent MA, (1 I j I a )  will migrate to thej-th server 
S (1 I j I la), respectively. After each mobile agent arrives 
at each corresponding server, the underlying mobile agent 
MA, (1 5 j I ?I) will give all its data and the executable 
code to the underlying server s j  (1 5 j 5 n )  . The server will 
execute the executable code provided by the underlying 
mobile agent i.e. f (  ) and fJignrd (' ). The details are as 
follows: 
(1) Each server si (1 5 j 5 a )  will construct the bid 
of the Bid, (1 5 j I n) .  Bid,) (1 I j I n )  is defined as 
follows: 
Bid' (1 2 j 2 a )  defines the bid of the j-tA server 
s j  (1 5 j 5 n )  for a selling activity. It includes: 1. the 
description of the server's product; 2. the minimum price that 
will be acceptable to the server; 3. a deadline for the delivery 
of the product; 4. a deadline for paying money into the bank 
account of the server; 5 .  an expiration date and time stamp. 
s, 
(2) The j-th server s j( l  5 j 5 n )  computes 
U, = HI (c, s j ,  Bidsj ] with a bid Bidsj (1 I j I a).  
(3) The j-th server s j  (1 5 j' I n )  computes 
mi = fI.1 
= a, - U  (mod p ) '  
If mj Omod p , he will stop, since that is a 
meaningless transaction for the j-th server s (1 5 j 2 n )  . 
Otherwise, he will go on the transaction. 
(4) The j- th server s,(l 5 j 5 n )  computes: 
Where g = g; E GI.  
( 5 )  The j-th server sj(l 5 j 5 a )  outputs the x- 
coordinate y j  of pj ,  where yj  is an element in z p  . 
(6) The j-th server s (1 5 j 5 n )  hands the mobile 
broker a tuple 
C, SI, Bids j ,  a j ,  m j ,  Yj ; 
This tuple will represent part of the transaction. 
D. Agent Broker Making Decisions 
In this procedure, the agent broker will help the customer 
compare the transactions and make decision on them , and 
then propose a recommendation to the customer. The details 
are the followings: 
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C, S j  ,Bid, J ,aj ,mj, yj  ; 
c, s, 9 Bids" 9 a,, 9 m,, 1 Yn ' 
from the mobile agents MA, ,  MA,,  . . . ,MA,, , she will record 
all the tuples. 
(2) The agent broker will check each time-stamp 
r ,  (1 I j I n )  on the j - t h  bid Bid, (1 I j I n ) .  If it is 
legal, she will verify the signature (mj, r j )  on it. The 
verification process is as follows: The agent broker will search 
a point in GI : g = (r:, W )  (where W is an element in 
2,) such that 
If such a point g = (TI, 69) exists, the signature on the bid 
is valid. Otherwise, the agent broker will put a satisfactory 
weight 0 on the transaction. 
(3) For those transactions on which the checking and 
verifying are both successful, the agent broker will compare 
the context of each bid and then put different values of 
satisfactory weight on these transactions according to their 
sarisfactmy degree with the purchase requirement. 
(4) The agent broker will choose the transaction whose 
satisfactory weight is the greatest one as an optimal 
transaction. Assume the optimal transaction is the i-rh bid 
Bid,, . The agent broker will make a recommendation Ri . 
agent MAj with the code (i.e. recommendation tuple) 
(5) The agent broker will arrange the the i-th mobile 
Ri , c, s; > Bidsj , a; I mi, Ti . 
to travel back to the customer. Here, (mi ,  z )  is an 
undetachable signature on the transaction. 
E. Accepting Transactions 
Afrer receiving the recommendation tuple, the customer will 
verify whether the signature on the recommendation tuple is 
valid, through searching a point G, : g i  = (3: , z ; )  (where 
z i  is an element in 2, ) such that 
e(g,, V H 2 ( n l ) )  = e(s,, g, ) jn+ .r?H~(m))H~(m)  
If the signature is valid, the customer will accept the 
transaction as an optimal purchase. 
In detail, if there is  no such point, then the customer will not 
accept this transaction. Otherwise, she will accept this 
transaction. 
That is to say, If the above equality holds, that certifies the 
transaction i s  valid. Also, since the recommendation Rj 
indicates this is an optimal transaction, and then the customer 
will accept the transaction. Otherwise, the customer will 
arrange the current mobile agent or another mobile agent to 
migrate to another server to seek a desirable bid and 
accomplish the transaction. 
IV. Analysis of the Transactions Protocol 
This section we will analyze the proposed protocol of 
transactions with mobile agents, We will provide the security 
analysis for the proposed protocol. That is, how to extract the 
signature scheme from transactions? Why it is secure against 
the server attack? At the same time, we will give a definition 
on what is server attack. In the second subsection, we will 
prove that the proposed protocol that answer the questions 
how the privacy is preserved for both the customer and the 
server. 
A. Security Analysis 
It is known that the mobile agents will be vulnerable 
even in a virtual community, where some servers may be 
hostile. Therefore, i t  is necessary for us to analyze the security 
of the proposed transaction protocol. In this paper, we give the 
security analysis based on the undetachable signature scheme, 
which has already been used in this transactions protocol. We 
first give a new definition, by which the server's attack is 
formalized; and then the security analysis will be processed 
with respect to this definition. 
Definition A server is successful in attacking this 
transaction protocol, if by utilizing some valid earlier 
transactions, the server can forge a new signature (8, p}  for a 
new requirement Req,*of  the customer, where 6 = 
t9 = H ,  (C, Reg,* )(mod p )  
e - 
and 
customer) such that: 
p = g; (in GI ) (where x is the private of key of the 
and 
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x H ,  (U-8) 
= gI P .  
. In the following, we prove that the proposed transaction 
protocol is secure against a server’s attack. 
Theorem 1 The proposed transaction protocol is secure 
against the attacks made by a hostile server. 
Proof By the definition above, the hostile server needs to 
produce a new valid signature (a, b) for a special transaction 
(a, m, r), given a history of valid transactions. In fact, it is 
easy_to produce a valid transaction (a, m, y)  for a given (a, 
b) bythe procedures of Executing the Mobilc Agent. However, 
It is hard to produce a new signature (a, b )  of the customer 
such that a includes a new requirement Re qc , and also the 
transaction is accepted by the customer. However, the server 
will encounter the problem of solving q-SDH. And the q-SDH 
problem is difficult [ 2 ] .  
B. Privacy Analysis 
In a virtual community, privacy is imperative with respect to 
every participant. In fact, it is known that pnvacy is paramount 
particularly in resptect to financial issues of the participants in 
the ‘electronics transactions (known as e-transaction or e- 
business). Therefore, besides the security analysis, it is also 
necessary to analyze the privacy of the proposed protocol. We 
will analyze the privacy of the e-transactions protocol from the 
following four aspects: 
Privacy of the signing key of the customer: This 
privacy is maintained by the mobile agent’s 
executable code, i.e. the pair of functions f (  ) and 
fsrgned( ), since the signing key is implied and 
embedded in the content of fslgnpd ( ) . 
Privacy of the identity of the customer: This privacy 
is maintained through the encrypted communication. 
In fact, when the customer sends the mobile agent to 
some servers to seek “optimal purchase”, she will 
encrypt the whole or part of the tuple 
1 .  
2. 
(f( ) , r f S l s n e d (  ) ,C ,Req , )  (if necessary for tfie 
whole content), by utilizing her private key prv,  of 
the underlying public key encryption. 
Privacy of the context of the e-Transaction initiated 
between the customer and a server: This privacy is 
maintained through the mutual encrypted 
communications between the customer and the 
servers, as well as the agent brokei, who will utilize 
the public key encryption algorithm established in the 
Setup algorithm of the e-Transaction protocoi. 
Privacy of the identity of the underlying servers: This 
privacy is maintained through the fact: when the agent 
3 
3 .  
4. 
broker hands the recommendation tuple 
Ri, c, si, Bidsi,  a,, m i ,  Ti to the mobile agent 
to migrate to the customer, the agent broker will 
encrypt the part of the tuple in which is reIated to its 
identity information., by utilizing her private key 
p ~ ,  of the underlying public key encryption. 
V. Performance Analysis 
In one-time successful e-transaction initiated by the 
customer, there are two rounds of communications between the 
customer and the underlying server. The computation 
workload is decided by the pair of functions f( ) and 
f,,,,( ) .  However, the function f( ) has only one 
modular minus calculation. The function fsigned ( ) and the 
public key encryption algorithm (if needed) are two important 
factors, which wili influence the performance of the e- 
transaction protocol. In fact, the function fsigned ( ) implies 
two exponentiation modular computations, and one of them is 
modular inversion exponentiation computation. Fortunately, 
the latter can be precomputed by the customer. At the same 
time, the computation workload of the public key encryption 
algorithm is directly linked to what public key encryption 
algorithm will be utilized. In addition, there involved two Weil 
pairings computation in the procedure of the Accepting the 
Transaction in subsection 3.E as above. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a new transaction protocol using 
mobile agents. This protocol could be looked on as an instant 
of models of a virtual community. In a virtual community 
environment, security and privacy are two important issues. 
Therefore, this paper provides two aspects of analysis, i.e. 
security and privacy. Apart from these, we have also provided 
the overview for the construction of the protocol. In addition, 
as an important associated product, a new undetachable 
signature scheme is implied in the proposed transaction 
protocol. This signature scheme is of short signatures, which 
are only about 128bits or 160 bits for a practical security level. 
That will be very efficient for the mobile agents, since they 
need low computational workloads. 
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